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1 Introduction
Voting plays a key role in the decision-making of democratic public or private organizations, like
states or unions, that care about the aggregate welfare of their constituents. Even when decision
making is delegated, electoral competition between policymaking candidates can generate optimal
policies that maximize social welfare (Mueller, 2003). In this respect, a crown jewel in the theory
of voting is the median voter theorem, which states that the ideal point of the median voter in
the policy space will be decisive (Downs, 1957). In deriving this result, theoretical models often
make strong assumptions concerning the available information. In particular, perfect information
about the preferences of both candidates and voters or about the probability distribution of a
candidate bias among the latter are often assumed (see Persson and Tabellini, 2002). Democratic
environments, however, are typically characterized by huge information problems and asymmetries.
Not only are policymakers and individual voters usually unaware of the distribution of policy
preferences in the electorate, but such preferences can and often do change over time, sometimes in
a dramatic fashion. Research on the channels through which information about policy preferences
are transferred in such environments is of great relevance to our understanding of democratic
governance under preference uncertainty. This paper contributes to this research by investigating
the role of spontaneous collective action involving advocacy as a means of preference revelation
that, in addition to voting, can help policymakers find optimal social policies.
Advocacy by unorganized grassroots movements has recently attracted great attention, in
particular, through its successful use by political candidates (like US president Obama) and their
role in the Arab Spring revolts. Advocacy groups have also been credited for having a strong
influence on legislation and government policies concerning, e.g., human rights and environmental
politics (e.g., Keck and Sikkink, 1998). More recently, it is even argued that new communication
technologies that greatly reduce the costs of advocacy have fundamentally changed how citizens,
political parties, and policymakers interact (e.g., Obar et al., 2012; Hamby, 2013). This purportedly
increased importance of independent advocacy groups calls for more research on the formation of
such groups and on the welfare consequences of their influence on policy outcomes.1 Because of
the complex environments in which advocacy groups emerge, studying their impact in the field is
fraught with difficulties. For this reason, we complement field research by conducting a laboratory
experiment that offers a controlled environment to analyze several important aspects of advocacy
that are otherwise hard to measure and evaluate.
The experiment is based on a two-candidate spatial electoral competition setting. Our main
focus is on the positioning of the candidates in a one-dimensional policy space where the (single-
peaked) policy preferences of the voters are not only unknown to the candidates but also change
over time. In a control treatment, the only information available to candidates is the voting
outcome of elections. In the advocacy treatments, we give voters the opportunity to organize
1An “advocacy group” is generally understood as a group that attempts to influence public policy through
activities such as demonstrations, media campaigns, public speaking, online petitions, and conducting exit polls.
Advocacy groups are distinct from political parties in that they do not aim to govern formally (Richardson, 1993).
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themselves at a cost into advocacy groups. Once formed, an advocacy group reveals to the can-
didates (and the electorate as a whole) information about the number of voters located at their
respective location in the policy space. Within this experimental framework we study three key
questions. Will voters form advocacy groups? If so, will advocacy groups help candidates to con-
verge to the median voter’s location? And, does the electorate as a whole benefit from advocacy
groups?
Our experimental setup captures two important asymmetries present in settings where ad-
vocacy groups can play an important role. The first is an informational asymmetry between
candidates and voters, which gives voters a reason to form groups in order to transmit information
to candidates. Specifically, voters know how many others share their own policy preference (but are
unaware of how voters with different policy preferences are distributed).2 The second asymmetry
concerns the costs of revealing information through advocacy. In the experiment, the formation
of a group reveals the precise number of voters in that location in the policy space. However, the
cost of forming the group is borne only by those who initiate it.3 This setup mimics situations
where a few activists can decide to take the lead in revealing the policy preferences of many, which
introduces a collective action problem and opens the door to free-riding.4
Although advocacy groups reveal information about voter preferences, it is not clear that it is
always in the best interest of voters to form an advocacy group. In addition to the costs discussed
above, an individual’s potential benefits from more public information depend on her location
relative to the median voter as well as the candidates’ responses to the revealed information. Since
voters face considerable uncertainty about their policy preference compared to those of others in
the electorate, forming an advocacy group is not a straightforward decision.
Whether advocacy groups speed up convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter
depends to a large extent on which advocacy groups form. On one extreme, if all voters organize
into advocacy groups, candidates will have perfect information concerning voter preferences and
convergence to the median voter should occur immediately. However, if advocacy groups are more
likely to form in distant locations vis-a`-vis the media voter and candidates fail to take this into
account, then advocacy groups could slow down policy convergence. Finally, the net social welfare
consequences of allowing people to advocate will depend on whether the potential benefits from
quicker convergence outweigh the costs of group formation.
Our main findings are the following. First, voters make frequent use of the costly option to
form an advocacy group, and, interestingly, the more so the larger the number of other voters
who are expected to participate. Second, advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence
2Assuming that voters have an information advantage over politicians regarding the number of voters who have
similar policy preferences seems justified as people interact more frequently with like-minded others.
3Examples of such costs asymmetries include demonstrations and online petitions where those who organize them
often incur high costs compared to those who attend or sign them.
4In our study the decision to form an advocacy group is taken simultaneously by each voter and just one individual
is needed to form a group. In this respect, the advocacy-group formation part of our study differs from the well-
established experimental literature on linear public goods (for a recent survey, see Chaudhuri, 2010) and is more
closely related to studies of best-shot public goods (e.g., Kroll et al., 2007; Cherry et al., 2013) or collective action
games (Sheremeta, 2011).
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to the preferred policy of the median voter and help to quickly equilibrate after a shock to the
preference distribution. Third, informative groups, i.e., groups that convey new information about
the distribution of preferences, but also uninformative advocacy groups are formed. These group
types show different determinants: only informative groups are responsive to the expected pe-
cuniary benefits from organizing; uninformative groups are more sensitive to the costs of group
formation. The latter groups also become less frequent over time and seem to be partly triggered
by a motive of “expressive advocacy” (comparable to expressive voting; Brennan and Buchanan,
1984). Fourth, in addition to the information revealed by the election outcomes, candidates rely
on the information generated by advocacy groups, however, they do not respond to uninformative
groups. Finally, we find that, given the parameters in the experiment, there are no higher pecu-
niary benefits to voters from advocacy as the average pecuniary gain from faster convergence are
offset by the costs of forming groups.
Our paper builds on previous studies that investigate mechanisms that help ameliorate informa-
tional problems in political decision-making. Starting with the work of McKelvey and Ordeshook
(1984, 1985a,b) and Collier et al. (1987), one branch of this literature demonstrates that, in spite
of the theoretical difficulties of analyzing elections with considerable preference uncertainty in
spatial policy spaces, simple behavior like retrospective voting often results in convergence to the
policy preferred by the median voter (for a review, see Palfrey, 2013). Within this literature,
our paper is more closely related to studies that investigate additional institutional channels of
information transfer like opinion polls, endorsements, and campaign contributions by lobby groups
(e.g., Williams, 1994; Sadiraj et al., 2006; Sinclair and Plott, 2012). Our study complements this
line of research by adding the possibility of preference revelation by voters through the endogenous
formation of advocacy groups.
Another strand of the literature on political decision-making focuses on the role of information
for the decision to vote. Studies in this area generally assume voting is costly and therefore
information on the preferences and costs of the electorate are relevant to individuals when they
decide whether they want to turn out (examples include Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Battaglini et al.,
2009; Großer and Schram, 2010; Morton and Tyran, 2011; Tyszler and Schram, 2013). Although
voting is compulsory and strategic voting is unlikely in our experiment, there is nevertheless a
parallel with this line of work in that participating in an advocacy group is costly and voters
benefit if others with similar policy preferences incur the participation costs. However, in our
study the benefits of participation are not necessarily positive for voters with policy preferences
that are far from those of the median voter.
Lastly, our work is related to the literature on information transmission to policymakers by
interest groups inspired by the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982). This work, however,
focuses on the strategic incentive of well-informed interest groups to misrepresent information
to uninformed policymakers (a review of this literature is provided by Grossman and Helpman,
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2001).5 By comparison, candidates and advocacy groups in our setting are equally uninformed
about the preferences of the rest of the electorate, which is arguably a more realistic assumption
in many settings of interest.
The organization of the paper is further as follows. Section 2 concerns the design and procedures
of the experiment, while Section 3 deals with theoretical considerations and hypotheses. Section 4
presents the results, focusing on policy dynamics, the behavior of voters and candidates, and the
welfare implications of advocacy groups. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Experiment
In the experiment, two candidates compete for votes in a one dimensional policy space with an
Euclidean representation of the policy issue. The electorate consists of 19 voters who are located
throughout the policy line. Subjects are either in the role of a voter or a candidate and they retain
this role throughout the 24 periods of the experiment. In each period t, one of the two candidates
plays the role of the incumbent and the other candidate the role of the challenger. The incumbent
is the candidate who won the election in period t− 1 and the challenger is the candidate who lost
that election. The challenger’s decision in period t consists of choosing a location `Ct on a policy
line with 15 locations. He can choose any location on the policy line except for the one occupied
by the incumbent, `It . In any period t > 1, the incumbent is bound to the location at which he
won in the previous period. In the first period, the role of the incumbent is randomly assigned
and his location is exogenously fixed at the midpoint, `I1 = 8. After the challenger chooses `
C
t , all
subjects observe the candidates’ locations: `Ct and `
I
t .
At this point, voters simultaneously cast their vote for one of the two candidates. Voting is
not costly and abstention is not feasible. Thereafter, all players are informed about the number
of votes received by the challenger and the incumbent. The candidate with a simple majority
(i.e., 10 or more votes) wins the election. The winning candidate earns 75 points and becomes
the incumbent in the following period. The losing candidate gets 0 points and becomes the next
period’s challenger. Hence, the candidates’ payoffs only depend on whether or not they win the
election and not on the location of the winner. Each voter has a single-peaked payoff function that
depends on the voter’s location (i.e., her most preferred policy) and the location of the candidate
that wins the election. Specifically, denoting the location of voter i in period t as `it and the
location of the winning candidate as `wt , the voter’s period payoff is given by
piit = a− b |`wt − `it| , a, b > 0.
In the experiment a = 70 and b = 5 points.
5Recent experimental work related to this framework includes Gneezy (2005), Sa´nchez-Page´s and Vorsatz (2007,
2008), Hao and Houser (2013), and Jiang (2013).
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Distribution of voters
It is common knowledge that there are 19 voters with single-peaked preferences distributed over
the 15 locations. Hence, there exists a unique location in each period t—the location of the median
voter—that is preferred by a majority of voters over any other location in the policy line. However,
the voters’ preferred policy—their location `it—does not stay constant throughout the experiment.
Subjects are informed that there will be two preference shocks and that a shock changes the location
of all voters, but they do not know in which periods the preference shocks will take place.6 The
experiment implemented preference shocks at the beginning of periods 10 and 18, respectively. In
the following, we will therefore focus our analysis on three distinct phases: phase 1 corresponds
to periods before the first preference shock (periods 1–9), phase 2 to periods between the first and
second shock (periods 10–17), and phase 3 to periods after the second preference shock (periods
18–24). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of voters over the policy line for each phase. In
phase 1, we implement a distribution with a median voter at location 12 (see the dark-red bar in
Figure 1). Phase 2 has the winning location at location 7. Finally, in phase 3, the median voter is
at location 3.
The experimental instructions do not contain any indication of how the 19 voters are distributed
across the policy space. Thus, subjects initially do not know the location of the median voter.
Voters do have some private information though. Each voter knows her own location and how
many other voters share it.7 However, voters have no private information concerning the location
of the remaining electorate. Candidates have no private information at all.
Treatments
The distribution of voters and the timing of the preference shocks discussed above are kept con-
stant throughout the experiment. As treatment conditions we varied the channels and cost at
which publicly-available information concerning the distribution of voters is transmitted. In our
control treatment, henceforth NA (No Advocacy), subjects only obtain information via the elec-
tion. Thus, when choosing a new location, challengers can base their decision only on previous
election outcomes.8
In our other treatments, henceforth AG (Advocacy Groups), we allow for the endogenous
formation of advocacy groups as an additional channel of information transmission. Before the
challenger chooses a location, voters simultaneously decide on whether or not to form an advocacy
6Subjects knew that the locations of voters would remain constant for at least two periods. That is, there are no
consecutive preference shocks. In addition, voters knew that any other voters sharing their new location would be
subjects with whom they did not share a location in previous phases.
7For example, in phase 1, every voter at location 6 knows that two other voters are at this location. Admittedly,
assuming that voters know the total number of other voters who share their policy preference is a strong assumption.
It would be more realistic to assume that voters have imperfect information concerning the number of other voters
in their location. However, this additional layer of uncertainty would complicate the game and, given the limited
size of the electorate, would nevertheless result in a very similar setup.
8For example, if a candidate at location 9 wins against one at location 8, this implies that the median voter was
located in one of the locations [9, 15].
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Figure 1: Distribution of voters over the policy line in phase 1 (periods 1–9), phase 2 (periods
10–17), and phase 3 (periods 18–24). The median voter’s location for each phase is indicated by
the dark (red) bars.
group. If at least one voter in a given location `′ initiates a group, the candidates and all other voters
are informed about the exact number of voters at location `′ in period t.9 Figure 2 summarizes
the sequence of events and choices within each period of the AG treatments (above and below the
line) and the NA treatment (only above the line).
The formation of advocacy groups (potentially) provides candidates with additional information
on the distribution of voters. A challenger can now base his location choice on past election results
and the information revealed by the advocacy groups. However, advocacy is not free; forming
an advocacy group in period t costs a total of c points. The cost is shared equally by all voters
in a location that form a group (e.g., if two voters in location `′ form a group then each pays c2
points). We implemented three different advocacy group treatments, which we call AG12, AG18
9By revealing the total number of voters in the location, we are modeling situations where there are important
costs asymmetries between those who organize the formation of advocacy groups and those who simply partake in
them. An alternative setup would be one in which subjects first decide whether to form an advocacy group at a
large cost and then decide whether they want to be part of the group at a lower cost. In this case, only those who
take part of the group would be revealed to the candidates. This alternative setup is more realistic but also more
complicated. For this reason we opted for our simplified setup, which already captures the basic features of advocacy
group formation.
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Figure 2: Time line of the events and choices within a period for the NA treatment (only entries
above the line) and the AG treatments (above and below the line).
and AG24. Each treatment involves different costs of forming an advocacy group: c = 12 in AG12,
c = 18 in AG18, and c = 24 in AG24.10
In order to better understand the motivations behind the formation of advocacy groups, we
also elicit the voters’ expectations concerning the costs and benefits of forming a group. After
subjects made their choice to form or not form a group, we ask each voter for: (i) the expected
number of other voters who will form an advocacy group at the voter’s preferred location, (ii) the
expected location of the winning candidate if a group is formed at the voter’s location, and (iii)
the expected location of the winning candidate if a group is not formed at the voter’s location.11
We elicit these expectations in the initial three periods as well as in the first two periods after each
preference shock (i.e., periods 1–3, 10–11, and 18–19).12
Finally, after the 24 periods of the game, subjects filled out a debriefing questionnaire that
included questions on demographic characteristics, political participation, and policy preferences.
Among others, subjects had to answer the following three questions on seven-point Likert scales:
“Do you participate in political demonstrations?”, “Do you vote in national and municipal elec-
tions?” (from 1=never to 7=always), and “One’s general political stance can be described (more
or less) as left or right. Where do you place yourself on the political scale?” (from 1=left to
7=right).
10For a discussion on these cost parameters, see Section 3 (Conjecture 4).
11We opted for non-incentivized belief elicitation as we did not want to distract subjects who are playing an already
complex game with an incentivized elicitation technique. Moreover, in some cases beliefs cannot be incentivized
because they are contingent on a subject’s own choices (e.g., asking a voter who already decided to form an advocacy
group for the expected location of the winning candidate if no group is formed). To the best of our knowledge, studies
comparing incentivized versus non-incentivized beliefs concerning the actions of others have not found that the latter
are biased (e.g., Friedman and Massaro, 1998; Sonnemans and Offerman, 2001), even though incentivized beliefs were
found to be more accurate (Ga¨chter and Renner, 2010). A detailed discussion is provided by Blanco et al. (2010).
12We did not elicit beliefs in all 24 periods because, due to the relative stability of the voters’ preferences, we
expected that most advocacy groups would be formed at the beginning of the game and shortly after each shock.
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Experimental procedures
We ran four sessions with 21 subjects (2 candidates and 19 voters) for each treatment (NA, AG12,
AG18 and AG24). In total, 336 subjects (208 men and 128 women) participated in the computer-
ized experiment, which was conducted in the CREED laboratory of the University of Amsterdam.
The subjects were students from all fields, half of whom were economics/business students. On
average, subjects earned 23.50 Euros and one session lasted approximately 90 minutes. Appendix
A contains a detailed description of the experimental procedures.
3 Behavioral Discussion
To provide a structure for our analysis of the experimental results, we now discuss the incentives
faced by subjects in the different roles. We first consider the voters’ behavior.
Voting
For voter i in period t, voting for the candidate who is closer to `it (weakly) increases that candi-
date’s chance of winning—irrespective of the other voters’ locations and behavior. Sincere voting
thus maximizes i’s expected payoff in a given period.
By contrast, the incentives to vote strategically for the candidate who is further away from `it
are ambiguous. Since convergence to the median voter location is bound to occur even if candidates
have no initial information on voter preferences (see McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1985a), the benefits
of strategic voting are limited to changing the speed of convergence. However, since voters start
with very little information about their location vis-a`-vis the median voter, it is initially unclear
whether they would benefit from such a change. For this reason, we do not expect to observe a
significant number of subjects voting strategically.13
Conjecture 1 Voters vote sincerely in the sense of voting for the candidate who is closer to their
preferred location in the current period.
Advocacy group formation
A payoff-maximizing voter will tradeoff the expected costs and benefits of forming a group. Benefits
emerge if voter i expects that the formation of an advocacy group at her location `it will make the
challenger move closer to `it (and win) as compared to the case without the group.
14 If advocacy
groups produce quicker convergence to the median voter’s location, a majority of voters have an
incentive to form groups. One might thus expect to see at least some groups being formed.
13This is not to say that strategic voting does not occur in experiments. Battaglini et al. (2009) and Morton and
Tyran (2011) demonstrate that subjects do vote strategically when the incentives to do so are clear.
14The expected benefit from a group are further shaped by the expectations regarding the location of the median
voter, the likelihood that other voters form advocacy groups, the subsequent responses of the candidates (see below),
and the expected number of periods until the median voter’s location changes (or the game ends).
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Recall that (i) the formation costs are only shared among those voters who decide to form
a group at location ` and that (ii) the information revealed by the group does not depend on
the number of voters bearing the costs. Voters who form a group therefore generate a positive
externality for other voters at their location,15 which introduces the possibility of free-riding: if
voter i expects at least one other voter at `it to form a group, she has a clear incentive not to
invest in group formation. The decision to form a group thus has a collective action element that
might hinder the formation of advocacy groups.16 However, since there is considerable evidence
demonstrating that individuals often solve collective action problems (see Camerer, 2003), we
expect that some advocacy groups will be formed, particularly when the (perceived) benefits of
doing so are large. Clearly, for a given set of beliefs, the net expected benefits of forming an
advocacy group are lower the higher the costs of doing so.17 Consequently, we expect more groups
to form at lower group-formation costs. It is also clear that there is a larger incentive to form
advocacy groups in the early periods of a phase, since voters can then expect to benefit from the
faster convergence for more periods.
Concerning the number of voters at a given location `, one might expect the likelihood of a
group formation to be increasing in the number of voters. Advocacy groups at highly populated
locations reveal more information and, plausibly, are more successful to attract challengers (relative
to groups at less populated locations). The expected benefits from forming a group would then
increase with the number of voters at `. However, one might also argue that locations with many
voters face more difficulties to solve the collective action problem and are therefore less likely to
form a group.18 It is therefore unclear whether we should observe more or fewer groups being
formed at highly populated locations. Lastly, one might argue that voters at locations that are
relatively far away from the incumbent have a higher incentive to form a group because in the event
that the median voter is close to their location they have more to gain from quicker convergence
than voters with a similar belief who are close to the incumbent.
Conjecture 2 There is active advocacy group formation. More groups are formed at lower costs
of doing so, at earlier periods within a phase, and at locations with a greater distance to the
incumbent.
15In addition to the “location-specific” externality, there is also a “global” externality on the whole electorate, as
advocacy groups affect the pace of convergence. As long as advocacy groups accelerate convergence, from which a
majority of voters benefit, this global externality is always positive.
16It is important to note that, depending on the relative difference between the cost and benefit of forming an
advocacy group, the decision to form a group is not necessarily dominated by that of not forming a group, which
would make the group-formation process more akin to a Hawk-Dove game than to a prisoners’ dilemma. For example,
if two voters in a given location agree that the benefit of forming an advocacy group equals piG and the cost of doing
so is c, then the group formation process has a Hawk-Dove game structure if piG > c and a prisoners’ dilemma
structure if 1
2
c < piG < c.
17For instance, if the formation of a group is expected to result in the winning candidate being three locations
closer, the expected gain would be 3b = 15 points. If no other voter from the own location is expected to form the
group, forming a group would then, ceteris paribus, be the expected payoff-maximizing action in AG12 (c = 12 < 15)
but not in AG18 or AG24.
18Experimental evidence from public good games does not support this idea (e.g., Isaac et al., 1994).
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Location choice of the challenger
As long as voters vote sincerely and the challenger does not always choose the same (losing)
location, there will be convergence towards the location of the median voter. The speed at which
convergence occurs will depend on the available information concerning the distribution of voters
along the policy line and on how candidates process this information. To illustrate this point,
let us consider two intuitive strategies that candidates can use to make their location choice: the
one-step and the multiple-step strategy.
The one-step strategy consists of the challenger always choosing the location immediately to
the left or to the right of the incumbent’s location, depending on the direction indicated by the
last election outcome (in the first period, challengers randomize between jumping to the left or
to the right). For example, if `It = 8 and `
C
t = 7 and the incumbent wins in period t, then the
challenger moves one step to the right of the incumbent in the next period, `Ct+1 = 9. According to
a multiple-step strategy, the challenger makes a random number of steps to the left or to the right
of the winning location from the last period—accounting for all available information and again
depending on the direction indicated by the electoral result (in the first period, the challenger
randomizes between all locations). For the example from above, he would randomly pick one
location `Ct+1 ∈ {9, . . . , 15}. For a case where, e.g., `Ct = 3 and the incumbent wins with `It = 8,
the challenger would randomly chooses `Ct+1 from {4, . . . , 7, 9, . . . , 15}.19
The one-step strategy is not only very simple; in a one-shot game, it is also the challenger’s
dominant strategy as it makes him win (if the incumbent is not yet at the median voter’s location).
In this sense, it is a myopic best-response. In a non-final period of a repeated game, the one-step
strategy delivers a certain win in the current period but is not necessarily dominant: taking one
step can be costly since the chosen location might not be the location of the median voter, which
gives the next period’s challenger the opportunity to hit the median voter’s location and win
all subsequent elections (until the end of the phase, i.e., when the winning location changes).
The multiple-step strategy implies that a challenger potentially makes several steps towards the
expected location of the median voter. In contrast to the one-step policy, this will lower the
challenger’s chance of winning the current period’s election. However, the strategy can increase
the probability of picking exactly the location of the median voter (and winning all remaining
elections in the phase) and thereby the speed of convergence.20
If there is little information about the distribution of voters, (risk averse) challengers might find
the one-step strategy appealing as it delivers at least one certain win. Ceteris paribus, the tradeoff
between the one-step and the multiple-step strategy is the same in all treatments. However, if
advocacy groups are formed in the AG treatments, challengers potentially have more information
on the distribution of voters in AG as compared to NA. The additional information reduces the risks
19Certainly, one can come up with many variations of a multiple-step strategy. We selected this one to serve as a
benchmark as it is relatively simple. It guarantees that the median voter’s location is reached in spite of preference
shocks and it incorporates the intuition that one ought to move in the direction of the winner.
20In Appendix B we provide a more detailed discussion of this case.
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associated with the multiple-step strategy, which makes it relatively more attractive.21 Moreover,
if advocacy groups form in the very first period, challengers might be more likely to pick the side
of the incumbent where the median voter is located instead of having a 50% chance of guessing
correctly. We therefore expect larger steps and quicker convergence under the AG treatment if
(sufficiently many) advocacy groups are indeed formed.
Conjecture 3 (a) Candidates converge to the location of the median voter in all treatments. (b)
There is faster convergence to the median voter’s location in the AG treatments compared to the
NA treatment.
Overall Payoffs
Since the sum of all voters’ payoffs is maximized at the median voter’s location, faster convergence
is clearly beneficial from a total payoff-maximizing perspective. The impact of advocacy groups
therefore depends on the benefits from quicker convergence, net of group formation costs. If people
hold overly optimistic expectations about the benefits, “excessive” group formations with negative
effects on earnings might occur. However, there is plenty of scope for advocacy groups to increase
aggregate payoffs. For instance, if we use the one-step strategy as a benchmark, there is a loss of
427.5 points (22.5 points per voter) compared to a hypothetical case of immediate convergence in
the first period of each phase. In principle, such immediate convergence could be achieved if an
advocacy group is formed in each non-empty location in each of the three phases (i.e., 7 advocacy
groups in phase 1, 6 in phase 2, and 6 in phase 3, which gives a total of 19 advocacy groups, see
Figure 1). As compared to the one-step strategy without groups, this level of group formations
(and assuming that it implies immediate convergence) would increase overall payoffs in AG12 and
AG18 but not in AG24.22 If the number of advocacy groups being formed is just enough to reveal
the location of the median voter (4 groups in phase 1, and 3 groups in phases 2 and 3) then there
would be payoff gains in all AG treatments.
Conjecture 4 Total payoffs are at least as high in the AG treatments as compared to the NA
treatment.
4 Results
This section discusses the experiment’s results. We first examine the speed at which candidates
converge to the location of the median voter. Thereafter we study the behavior of voters and can-
21To illustrate this point, consider the distribution of voters in phase 1 (see Figure 1). For instance, if advocacy
groups form at locations 12–15, the median voter’s location would be revealed to the candidates, and the challenger
can immediately jump to location 12. Even for cases where the location of the median voter is not precisely identified,
the information revealed by advocacy groups ought to help challengers to form more accurate expectations of the
distribution of voters and hence make them more willing to take larger steps towards the (expected) median voter’s
location. In turn, this will speed up convergence.
22Put differently, across the three phases, a maximum of 35 advocacy groups can form in AG12 (35× 12 < 427.5),
23 in AG18 (23×18 < 427.5), and 17 in AG24 (17×24 < 427.5) without producing a payoff loss from groups having
formed.
11
18
15
1
8
15
1 10 18 24 1 10 18 24
NA AG12
AG18 AG24
Mean location of winning candidate Location of median voter
Lo
ca
tio
n
Period
Figure 3: Mean location of the winning candidate (thick blue line) and the location of the median
voter (thin red line) for every period in each of the four treatments. The dotted line in AG12
corresponds to the mean winning location excluding the outlier election (see Section 4.2).
didates which drives the aggregate outcome. The section concludes with the welfare implications
of advocacy group formation.
4.1 Convergence to the median voter
Figure 3 provides us with a first impression of whether and how fast candidates converge to the
location of the median voter. It depicts the location of the median voter and the mean location
of the winning candidate in each treatment. In line with Conjecture 3.a, we observe that the
winning candidate clearly converges towards the location of the median voter in all treatments.
This result is also evident in Figure C.1 in Appendix C, which shows the convergence paths of
each single session. Convergence in the NA treatment is in line with earlier studies that show that
information concerning the vote tally is enough to produce movement towards the median voter
(e.g., Collier et al., 1987; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1990b). Figure 3 also suggests that, in line
with Conjecture 3.b, there is faster convergence towards the median voter’s location in the AG
treatments compared to NA. We explore this impression in more detail next.
A different way of measuring convergence is based on the absolute distance between the lo-
cations of the winning candidate and the median voter. Table 1 provides summary statistics for
this distance for each treatment. In addition, the lower part of the table provides the mean and
standard deviation one would obtain if candidates used one of the benchmark strategies described
in Section 3: the one-step strategy (choosing the location immediately to the left/right of the in-
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Table 1: Mean distance between the locations of the winning candidate and the median voter.
Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Overall Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
NA 1.53 (0.42) 1.36 (0.63) 1.31 (0.22) 2.00 (0.62)
All AGs 0.88 (0.53) 1.31 (1.08) 0.17 (0.18) 1.15 (0.62)
AG12 1.12 (0.65) 1.42 (1.43) 0.25 (0.23) 1.75 (1.31)
AG18 0.66 (0.58) 0.89 (0.99) 0.22 (0.16) 0.86 (0.71)
AG24 0.86 (0.32) 1.61 (0.96) 0.03 (0.06) 0.86 (1.17)
One-step strategy 1.19 (0.16) 0.89 (0.22) 1.56 (0.31) 1.14 (0.29)
Multiple-step strategy 1.14 (0.39) 0.94 (0.58) 1.46 (0.80) 1.01 (0.64)
cumbent) and the multiple-step strategy (randomly choosing among the locations to the left/right
of the loser of the last election).
On the whole, the data support conjecture 3.b: the mean distance between the winning can-
didate and the location of the median voter is 1.53 locations in NA, but only 0.88 locations in
the AG treatments. According to a Fligner-Policello robust rank order test (henceforth RRO; see
Fligner and Policello, 1981), this latter distance is significantly lower than the former (U = 2.913,
p ≤ 0.024; using session means as independent observations).23 A closer analysis shows that
the treatment differences are mainly driven by the last two phases. While there is no significant
difference in convergence between the NA and the AG treatments in phase 1 (U = 0.338), the
AG treatments show significantly faster convergence in phases 2 and 3 (U = 6.928, p ≤ 0.006,
and U = 1.972, p ≤ 0.100).24 When we compare the NA to each AG treatment separately, we
find a significantly better convergence in AG18 (U = 2.502, p ≤ 0.057) and AG24 (U = 4.484,
p ≤ 0.029). For AG12, the distance to the median voter’s location is not significantly different
to NA (U = 1.027). Looking separately at each phase yields no significant differences in phase 1
(U < 1.017). By contrast, in phase 2 we find significantly faster convergence in each AG treat-
ment compared to NA (U ≥ 5.060, p ≤ 0.029). Lastly, in phase 3 we observe significantly faster
convergence in AG18 (U = 3.364, p ≤ 0.057), AG24 (U = 1.586, p ≤ 0.100), and no significant
difference in AG12 (U = 0.239).25
Figure 4 offers further insights of why we see faster convergence in the AG treatments. It
plots the mean distance between the winning candidate and the location of the median voter over
periods for the NA (thin red lines) and the AG treatments (thick blue lines). We can see that
convergence towards the median voter’s location happens more gradually in NA as compared to
the AG treatments. In the latter, we typically observe an immediate jump close to the median
voter’s location in the first period of each phase (particularly in phases 2 and 3). In the AG
treatments, the median voter’s location is reached in the first period of a phase 30.56% of the time
and by the third period 63.89% of the time. In NA, there is not a single case where convergence
23Motivated by our directional hypotheses, the non-parametric results throughout the paper are presented with
exact p-values of one-sided tests.
24If we exclude one outlier election discussed in Section 4.2, the test results for phase 3 are U = 3.087 and p ≤ 0.024.
25If we exclude the outlier election discussed in Section 4.2, we find significantly faster convergence also in AG12
(U = 1.586, p ≤ 0.100).
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Figure 4: Mean distance between the location of the winning candidate and the location of the
median voter. Thick blue lines correspond to the AG treatments whereas thin red lines correspond
to NA. The dotted line in AG12 corresponds to the mean distance excluding the outlier election
(see Section 4.2).
occurred within three periods. The fastest case of convergence occurs in four periods. Hence, in
NA candidates adopt a strategy that is roughly consistent with the one-step strategy discussed
above, whereas in the AG treatments we observe behavior that is more akin to a multiple-step
strategy. In fact, if we look at Table 1 we can see that in phases 2 and 3, convergence in AG18
and AG24 is faster than the mean convergence implied by the multiple-step strategy. This first
set of findings is summarized in:
Result 1 In all treatments candidates converge to the location of the median voter. In NA, con-
vergence is gradual as candidates tend to move one step at a time. In contrast, in AG treatments,
candidates take multiple steps towards the median voter’s location. This results in faster conver-
gence, in particular, in the latter two phases.
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4.2 Voting
We now turn to the behavior that underlies these observations. Let us first consider voting. We
find clear support for conjecture 1. In NA, 97.26% of the votes are in line with sincere voting. Only
2.74% of the votes are cast for the candidate located further away from the respective voter. In the
AG treatments, sincere voting explains 93.97% of the votes in AG12, 94.24% in AG18, and 95.50%
in AG24. If we test for statistical differences using session means as independent observations, we
find significantly less sincere voting in the AG treatments compared to NA (U = 4.222, p ≤ 0.011).
While this might be due to the increased complexity of the AG game, the rate of “correct” votes
is still quite high relative to “error” rates of 20–30% that were observed in earlier experimental
studies (e.g., McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1990a,b).
Result 2 The vast majority of votes are sincere, in the sense of voting for the candidate who is
closer to a voter’s preferred location.
Although very rare, “insincere” voting sometimes produced divergence from the location of the
median voter—an observation, which is not specific to our experiment but commonly made in the
literature (see Collier et al., 1987; McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1990a). Our data include 12 out
of 384 elections (3.13%) where the candidate further away from the median voter’s location won
the election. With one exception, this had only a small impact on convergence. In one session
in AG12, however, two subjects simultaneously voted for a candidate in a faraway location in
the penultimate period. The result was a 12-location shift away from the location of the median
voter (see session 1 in AG12, Figure C.1 in Appendix C). Since this election outcome was clearly
an extreme outlier, we also report the effects when we exclude this election (and the subsequent
period) from the data analysis.
4.3 Formation of Advocacy Groups
Our first result showed that the opportunity to form advocacy groups facilitates convergence.
We now study the voters’ actual decisions to form advocacy groups. Table 2 contains summary
statistics for the mean number of advocacy groups formed per phase. Figure 5 depicts the formation
of advocacy groups over periods and phases. Clearly, voters frequently form advocacy groups. On
average, 29.00 groups are formed per session. Moreover, there seems to be a negative relationship
between the cost of forming an advocacy group and the number of groups being formed: on average,
34.25 groups are formed in AG12, followed by 26.75 in AG18, and 26.00 in AG24. Thus, in line
with conjecture 2, we find strong evidence that voters form advocacy groups and that the number
of groups declines as costs increase.
Figure 5 reveals that most advocacy groups are formed in the first period of each phase,
particularly in phases 2 and 3. This behavior explains how candidates managed to converge so
quickly to the median voter’s location: there was plenty of information available already in the
first period. However, from the point of view of information transmission, voters are forming
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Table 2: Mean number of advocacy groups distinguishing between groups that reveal new infor-
mation in a phase and groups that do not. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
All AG AG12 AG18 AG24
Overall
All advocacy groups 29.00 (9.27) 34.25 (12.07) 26.75 (4.35) 26.00 (9.76)
Informative groups 16.17 (1.47) 16.00 (0.82) 16.75 (1.89) 15.75 (1.71)
Uninformative groups 12.83 (8.66) 18.25 (11.47) 10.00 (4.16) 10.25 (8.22)
Phase 1
All advocacy groups 13.67 (4.16) 15.50 (5.45) 13.25 (1.26) 12.25 (4.99)
Informative groups 6.08 (1.00) 6.25 (0.50) 6.50 (1.00) 5.50 (1.29)
Uninformative groups 7.58 (3.68) 9.25 (4.99) 6.75 (1.50) 6.75 (4.11)
Phase 2
All advocacy groups 8.42 (3.23) 10.00 (4.16) 7.75 (2.50) 7.50 (3.11)
Informative groups 5.00 (0.60) 5.00 (0.00) 5.00 (0.82) 5.00 (0.82)
Uninformative groups 3.42 (3.12) 5.00 (4.16) 2.75 (2.50) 2.50 (2.65)
Phase 3
All advocacy groups 6.92 (2.84) 8.75 (3.86) 5.75 (0.96) 6.25 (2.63)
Informative groups 5.08 (0.79) 4.75 (0.50) 5.25 (0.96) 5.25 (0.96)
Uninformative groups 1.83 (2.82) 4.00 (3.92) 0.50 (0.58) 1.00 (2.00)
too many groups. After all, if an advocacy group is formed at each non-empty location in every
phase, there would be 19 groups formed in a session (7 advocacy groups in phase 1 and 6 in both
phases 2 and 3)—in the AG12 treatments we observe nearly twice as many groups on average.
To further explore this excessive group formation behavior, we classify each advocacy group as
being either informative or uninformative. Informative groups are those that, by forming, reveal
new information to the candidates within a phase. Uninformative groups correspond to those that
form at locations where a group had already formed within the same phase. In other words, they
do not convey new information to the candidates.26
The mean number of informative and uninformative groups in each treatment can be seen in
Table 2 and Figure 5 (in the figure uninformative groups are visualized as the difference between all
groups and informative groups). In all treatments and phases, the number of informative groups
is close to the maximum: overall, 6.08 out of 7 groups form in phase 1, 5.00 out of 6 groups in
phase 2, and 5.08 out of 6 groups in phase 3. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 5, informative
groups are formed almost exclusively in the first couple of periods of each phase. Hence, the group
formations almost completely revealed the distribution of voters early on in each phase of the
experiment.
In addition to informative groups, voters frequently form uninformative groups. In total,
uninformative groups account for nearly half of all advocacy groups (44.26%). In AG12, where the
formation of a group is relatively cheap, we observe the highest mean number of uninformative
groups (18.25 groups). With higher costs, a smaller but still sizeable number of uninformative
26The terms informative and uninformative are more accurate from the perspective of voters, who know whether a
new phase has started. By and large, candidates cannot distinguish between informative and uninformative groups
because they do not know when preference shocks occur. Candidates only know that preference shocks do not occur
in consecutive periods (see footnote 6). In this respect, uninformative groups could still convey useful information.
For example, if interpreted as such, uninformative groups might be used to signal to the candidates that voter
preferences have not changed.
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Figure 5: Mean number of advocacy groups formed per period distinguishing between all groups
(light blue bars) and groups that reveal new information in a phase (dark blue bars), and mean
fraction of voters per location who choose to form an advocacy group distinguishing between all
groups (thick lines) and groups that reveal new information in a phase (dashed lines).
groups are formed: 10.00 groups in AG18 and 10.25 groups in AG24. As with informative groups,
voters are less likely to form an uninformative group in the latter periods of a phase, although the
decrease is not as pronounced as for informative groups. A clear difference between the two type of
groups is also evident when we look at group formation across phases. Unlike informative groups,
there is a clear tendency towards fewer uninformative groups in the later phases. An impression
that is confirmed by the correlation between phase number and the amount of uninformative
groups. In all treatments, the Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient is negative, and for
both AG18 and AG24, it is significantly different from zero (AG12: ρ = −0.42 and p = 0.176;
AG18: ρ = −0.82 and p = 0.001; AG24: ρ = −0.66 and p = 0.018). Hence, the formation of
uninformative groups significantly declines with experience.
At the individual level, forming an advocacy group is a common decision, but it is far from
universal. Over all three phases, 28.51% of voters never formed an advocacy group, 20.61% formed
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an advocacy group once, 19.74% formed an advocacy group twice, and only 31.14% formed an
advocacy group three times or more. As a consequence, the cost of forming a given advocacy
group is borne by a few voters in each location. This can seen in Figure 5, which displays the
mean fraction of voters per location who choose to form an advocacy group over periods and
phases. The figure reveals that in a given period, on average, at most half of the voters per
location form an advocacy group. If we separate the decision by whether the group formed was
informative or uninformative, we find that the cost of forming informative groups is borne by many
more voters compared to the cost of forming uninformative groups. For instance, 64.04% of voters
formed at least one informative advocacy group while only 35.53% of voters formed at least one
uninformative advocacy group.
To study the voters’ motivation to form advocacy groups in more detail, we conduct a regression
analysis. As dependent variable we use a dummy that equals one if a voter i chooses to form a
group in period t and zero otherwise. Our key independent variables are the number of voters in
i’s current location, the distance between i’s location and the location of the incumbent, a dummy
variable indicating whether the candidates have converged to the location of the median voter, the
total cost of forming a group, the number of periods since the beginning of the current phase, and
dummy variables indicating the phase number. Accounting for the panel structure of our data
(recall that we observe 24 decisions for each voter), we estimate the effect of these variables on
group formation choices using the random-effects Probit model. The estimated coefficients from
the basic specification are presented in column (I) of Table 3.
The estimation results in column (I) support conjecture 2. First, the estimates indicate a
negative coefficient for the cost of forming a group, although, it is not significant at conventional
levels (p = 0.104). Second, voters are more likely to form a group the larger the distance between
their location and the location of the incumbent. Third, groups are more likely to be formed
in the early periods of each phase and group formation declines in the second and third phases.
In addition to these findings, we also see that voters’ propensity to form a group is significantly
higher the larger the number of voters sharing a location. This suggests that—consistent with
evidence from public goods games (e.g., Isaac et al., 1994)—voters at highly populated locations
still manage to solve the collective action problem and effectively form more groups than voters
at less populated locations. Specification (I) also shows that voters are significantly less likely to
form a group once candidates have converged to the median voter’s location, which is reassuring
as it corroborates the voters’ understanding of the game.
In column (II), we add the information obtained from the debriefing questionnaire as additional
control variables. Specifically, we include dummies indicating female subjects, political orienta-
tion (equal to one for the 50% of subjects that lean most to the left), participation in political
demonstrations (equal to one for the 50% of subjects that participate the most), and participation
in elections (equal to one for the 50% of subjects that participate the most).27 Interestingly, the
27Three subjects failed to complete the debriefing questionnaire. Hence, the number of subjects drops from
N = 228 to N = 225 in specifications (II), (IV) and (VI). See the note on Table 3.
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Table 3: Determinants of advocacy group formation (random-effects Probit)
All AG Informative AG Uninformative AG
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Cost of AG formation -0.018 -0.019∗ -0.003 -0.002 -0.027∗ -0.029∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015) (0.014)
# voters at location 0.176∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.017
(0.062) (0.063) (0.071) (0.071) (0.088) (0.088)
Distance to the incumbent 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Converged -0.581∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.646∗∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗ -0.157 -0.162
(0.086) (0.087) (0.141) (0.141) (0.106) (0.106)
Periods since start of phase -0.259∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.568∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.043) (0.045) (0.020) (0.020)
Phase 2 -0.147∗ -0.140∗ 0.076 0.087 -0.410∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.085) (0.106) (0.107) (0.110) (0.110)
Phase 3 -0.536∗∗∗ -0.538∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗ -0.213∗∗ -0.788∗∗∗ -0.776∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.088) (0.105) (0.106) (0.130) (0.131)
Female -0.408∗∗∗ -0.399∗∗∗ -0.267∗
(0.112) (0.097) (0.148)
Left leaning -0.169 -0.097 -0.183
(0.116) (0.098) (0.154)
Participated in demonstrations 0.368∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗
(0.119) (0.100) (0.157)
Participated in elections 0.101 0.085 0.139
(0.108) (0.091) (0.143)
Obs. (N × T ) 5472 5400 5472 5400 5472 5400
Note: The dependent variable equals one if voter i forms an advocacy group in period t and zero
otherwise. I and II consider the formation of all advocacy groups, III and IV the formation of informative
groups, and V and VI the formation of uninformative groups. N = 228 in I, III, and V, and N = 225 in II,
IV, VI; T = 24 periods. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level.
estimates reveal that subjects who most frequently participate in demonstrations are also more
likely to form advocacy groups. In contrast, we do not see this effect for participation in elections.
This finding suggests that subjects might be motivated to form advocacy groups by a specific desire
to make themselves heard, but it is not part of a more general desire for political participation
(Brennan and Lomasky, 1997). We also find that, compared to men, women are less likely to form
groups. Comparing columns (I) and (II) also shows that the inclusion of the additional controls
has a very small effect on the estimates from the baseline specification. The only difference is that
the effect of the costs of group formation is now significant at the 10% level.
To account for potential differences in the motivation behind the formation of informative and
uninformative groups, we run additional regressions with the same specification as in columns
(I) and (II) but distinguish between these two types of groups. Columns (III) and (IV) report
estimates that use a dummy indicating whether voter i forms an informative group in period t
as the dependent variable. The results are quite similar to the ones from columns (I) and (II).
The most noticeable difference is that the coefficient for the group formation cost is considerably
smaller and no longer significant. In other words, the creation of informative advocacy groups
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does not seem to depend on the cost of forming groups—at least for the range of costs considered
in our treatments.
Columns (V) and (VI) display the estimates where the dependent variable is a dummy in-
dicating whether voter i forms an uninformative group. These last two specifications point to
substantial differences in the motives underlying the formation of uninformative versus informa-
tive groups. In particular, the formation of uninformative advocacy groups is neither driven by
the number of voters in a location or the distance to the incumbent, nor by whether candidates
have already converged to the median voter’s location. Thus, in contrast to informative groups,
the formation of uninformative groups is not driven by most variables measuring the amount of
transmitted information, which is consistent with the fact that uninformative groups do not trans-
mit new information to the candidates. By contrast, for uninformative groups the cost of group
formation has a significantly negative effect, indicating that the formation of uninformative groups
is more cost sensitive. Moreover, mirroring the decline across phases seen in Table 2, the estima-
tions display a substantial negative effect on the formation of uninformative groups in phases 2
and 3. One might argue that, as voters acquire experience, they learn that uninformative groups
are ineffective and thus form fewer uninformative groups. However, the fact that we observe un-
informative groups also in the last phase of AG12, where group formation costs are low, might
be interpreted in terms of some voters’ desire to simply express their preferences (Brennan and
Buchanan, 1984; Brennan and Lomasky, 1997).
Result 3 Voters make frequent use of the opportunity to form advocacy groups. Two different
types of groups are formed: informative groups, which transmit new information, and uninforma-
tive groups, which provide no new information. The determinants for forming these groups differ.
Before convergence, subjects in locations with many other voters and in locations with a larger
distance to the incumbent are more likely to form informative groups. In contrast, the formation
of uninformative groups is independent of these characteristics but is relatively more sensitive to
costs.
In a next step, we move beyond the analysis of the objective descriptors of voters’ situations
and examine the impact of voters’ subjective beliefs. Recall that we elicit proxies for the subjects’
beliefs concerning the costs and benefits of forming an advocacy group in seven periods (1–3, 10–
11, and 18–19). To capture the benefits from a group, we asked each voter to indicate the expected
location of the winning candidate for two situations: when a group forms in the voter’s location
and when a group does not form in that location. The difference between these expected locations
gives us a proxy of the voter’s expected benefit of forming an advocacy group. To measure beliefs
regarding the costs of a group formation, voters are asked to indicate the expected number of other
voters at their location who will choose to form a group. Since the total costs of a group are shared
with these voters, this expectation determines the voters’ expected cost.28
28On average, subjects believe that 0.73 other voters will form a group in their location. The mean belief is largest
in AG12 (0.78), followed by AG18 (0.75), and AG24 (0.67).
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Table 4: Determinants of advocacy group formation and voters’ beliefs (random-effects Probit)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Expected # voters forming an AG 2.323∗∗∗ 2.398∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.164)
Expected gain from forming an AG 0.226∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.027)
Cost of AG formation -0.009 0.004 -0.008 0.005
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
# voters at location 0.194∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗
(0.077) (0.091) (0.080) (0.096)
Distance to the incumbent 0.085∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026)
Converged -0.461∗∗∗ -0.389∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ -0.380∗∗
(0.142) (0.169) (0.145) (0.174)
Periods since start of phase -0.410∗∗∗ -0.223∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗
(0.068) (0.081) (0.070) (0.085)
Phase 2 -0.058 -0.050 0.060 0.048
(0.111) (0.132) (0.116) (0.140)
Phase 3 -0.339∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗ -0.230∗ -0.168
(0.113) (0.133) (0.118) (0.141)
Female -0.510∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.556∗∗∗ -0.533∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.145) (0.132) (0.154)
Left leaning -0.123 -0.113 -0.124 -0.114
(0.133) (0.150) (0.135) (0.157)
Participated in demonstrations 0.390∗∗∗ 0.262∗ 0.351∗∗ 0.217
(0.139) (0.152) (0.139) (0.160)
Participated in elections 0.092 0.096 0.071 0.099
(0.126) (0.139) (0.128) (0.146)
Obs. (N × T ) 1575 1575 1575 1575
Note: The dependent variable equals one if voter i forms an advocacy group in period t and zero
otherwise. N = 225 voters, T = 7 periods. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 4 presents the regressions analyzing the effect of the voters’ beliefs.29 We first replicate
specification (II) from Table 3 using the restricted sample of periods for which we collected data
on beliefs. As can be seen in column (I) of Table 4, the results are qualitatively similar to the
ones obtained with the full sample. Specifications (II) to (IV) gradually introduce the data on the
voters’ beliefs. We find positive and statistically significant coefficients for both the expected gain
(in locations) of forming an advocacy group and the expected number of other voters forming a
group. It is reassuring to see that, as one would expect, the more the voters think they will attract
the challenger by forming a group, the more likely they are to form one. What is more surprising
is the positive effect of the expected number of other voters on forming a group.
If voters maximize solely their monetary payoff, we should get a negative coefficient for this
variable because the fact that others are forming a group allows voters to enjoy the gains of the
advocacy group without having to pay its cost. However, instead of free-riding on the efforts of
others, it appears that voters have a preference to conditionally cooperate when forming advocacy
29Note that we do not distinguish between informative and uninformative groups. The reason is that we elicited
beliefs in early periods in each phase. During these periods, basically all groups are informative.
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groups. In other words, the more other voters are expected to join in the collective effort to
form a group, the more likely a voter will participate in the formation herself.30 This finding
provides suggestive evidence on conditionally cooperative voters and parallels results from public
good experiments (Keser and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter,
2010).
When we control for the voters’ beliefs, the dummy for phase 3 as well as the variable indicating
frequent participation in political demonstrations lose statistical significance in specification (IV).
This observation indicates that the decline in group formation in the third phase of the experiment
is driven by changes in beliefs concerning the costs and benefits from forming a group, which is in
line with voters’ learning during the course of the experiment. This point is also reflected in the
descriptive statistics. In the first phase of the experiment, voters expect the winning candidate
to be 0.92 steps closer to their location if a group is formed there. In the second (third) phase,
the corresponding number is 0.33 (0.32) steps. Hence, in later phases of the game, voters expect
that advocacy groups have a significantly smaller impact on the location choice (U = 3.687,
p ≤ 0.001 and U = 3.834, p ≤ 0.001 when comparing phase 1 with phases 2 and 3 respectively).
The results further indicate that subjects who frequently participate in political demonstrations
are significantly more optimistic, regarding the others’ inclination to form advocacy groups: those
who frequently joined political demonstrations expect on average 0.89 other voters to form a group,
whereas subjects who do not participate as often only expect 0.68 other voters to form a group.
The difference is statistically significant (p ≤ 0.010).
Result 4 In line with rational decision-making, voters’ expected benefits from an advocacy group
and their willingness to form a group are positively correlated. However, the positive correlation
between expectations about other voters forming a group and their own decision conflicts with the
idea of free-riding: voters are more likely to form an advocacy group, the more others are expected
to engage in the group formation.
Let us briefly recap the findings from this subsection. Our analysis of the advocacy group
formation shows that voters form informative advocacy groups in situations where they are likely
to gain from the information transmission to the candidates. Informative groups are formed in
early periods within a phase, in locations that are far from the incumbent and when they expect
to attract the winning candidate. Interestingly, voters seem to behave conditionally cooperative—
they are more likely to invest into the collective action of forming a group if they expect others
will do so as well.
Our results also indicate that the formation of uninformative groups is driven by quite different
motives. In particular, uninformative groups are most likely to be formed in the first phase of the
experiment—when voters have still little experience with the game. Moreover, uninformative
groups appear more often when the costs to form them are relatively low. This result can be
30Admittedly, our finding could also be driven by cognitive dissonance. In other words, voters who form a group
might be rationalizing their behavior ex-post by indicating that they expect others will do the same.
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explained with models of noisy decision making if we think of uninformative groups as mistakes.
In this case, the effect of the cost of group formation is explained by assuming that mistakes are
more likely when they are less costly. In line with this interpretation, the decline of uninformative
groups in the later phases can be seen as a learning effect. A similar interpretation is that voters
attempt to trick the candidates into thinking that a new phase has started by forming a group,
but they learn that this strategy is ineffective, either because a candidate has already converged
to the median voter’s location or because candidates anticipate this type of attempts. Finally,
one could also interpret our results as evidence of an affective response that gives voters pleasure
from displaying their presence—similar to expressive voting (e.g., Tyran, 2004; Feddersen et al.,
2009)—and is evaluated against the cost of doing so (Brennan and Buchanan, 1984; Brennan and
Lomasky, 1997). The latter interpretation is more consistent with the fact that the formation of
uninformative groups is not affected by other variables such as the candidates having converged
to the median voter’s location or the distance between the voter and the incumbent.
4.4 Candidates
We now come to the candidates’ behavior. In particular, we are interested in analyzing how the
speed at which candidates move towards the median voter’s location is related to the (i) information
revealed through voting and (ii) the formation of advocacy groups. To capture the speed at which
challengers move towards the location of the median voter, we construct a variable that counts
the number of locations that a challenger moves in the direction of the median voter (taking the
location of the incumbent as the starting point). In other words, in each period we look at the
absolute distance between the location chosen by the challenger and the location of the incumbent.
If the challenger moves towards the median voter’s location, we consider this distance to be positive
and otherwise it is negative.31
The first explanatory variable, the vote margin, is a measure of the additional information
contained in the election’s vote tally (i.e., in addition to the information revealed by the fact that
a specific candidate won/lost the election). It equals the number of votes by which the current
incumbent won the previous election. To account for the few cases of divergence (see Section 4.2)
we code this number as positive if the winner was the candidate closest to the median voter’s
location and negative if the winner was the candidate furthest away. Thus, the variable captures
the strength of the information contained in the electoral result as well as whether this information
points candidates towards the location of the median voter.
The second explanatory variable, the informative AG margin, measures the information re-
vealed by advocacy groups. Specifically, it equals the total number of voters in a phase who have
been revealed to the left (right) minus the number of voters revealed to the right (left) of the cur-
31This approach is justifiable as there are hardly any cases in which challengers overshoot the median voter’s
location. Using a similar dependent variable where we use the absolute improvement towards the median voter’s
location relative to the location of the incumbent yields very similar results. However, it is substantially more
complicated to interpret the coefficients for this alternative dependent variable.
23
Table 5: Determinants of the challenger’s location choice (OLS estimates)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
All treatments AG treatments
Vote margin 0.116∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.094∗ 0.095∗
(0.037) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
NA -2.655∗∗ -2.597∗∗
(1.125) (1.158)
Vote margin × NA -0.030
(0.062)
Informative AG margin 0.219∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.076)
Total AG margin 0.014
(0.038)
Obs. 191 191 125 125
Note: The dependent variable is the number of locations the challenger moves in the direction of the
median voter’s location in period t. Regressions include period and session dummies (not reported).
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level.
rent incumbent, given that in the current period the median voter is located to the left (right).32
Paralleling the vote margin, this variable measures the strength of the information revealed by
advocacy groups and whether this information points candidates towards the median voter’s lo-
cation. Our third explanatory variable, the total AG margin, is constructed in the same way as
the informative AG margin except that, instead of counting revealed voters at most once during a
phase, it continues to count these voters every time an advocacy group is formed (within a phase).
This variable allows us to test whether the formation of uninformative groups has an effect on the
candidates’ behavior.
We regress the movement of the challenger on these measures for the different sources of infor-
mation using OLS. All estimates include a full set of period fixed effects as well as session dummies.
Moreover, we only use periods before candidates converge to the median voter’s location. The re-
sults are presented in Table 5. Specification (I), which is based on data from all treatments,
includes the vote margin and a dummy for the NA treatment as regressors. The estimates show a
significantly positive coefficient for the vote margin, indicating that challengers do use the informa-
tion contained in the vote tally when making their location choice: a stronger voting result makes
challengers take larger steps. At the same time, the coefficient for NA is significantly negative.
This captures the fact that challengers in the NA treatment take—for a given vote margin—steps
which are on average 2.6 locations smaller towards the median voter (see Section 4.1). In column
(II), we add an interaction term between the vote margin and the NA treatment dummy. The
coefficient of the interaction term is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the in-
32A revealed voter is a voter whose location is known because at least one advocacy group has been formed at her
location in the current phase. Consider an example which is based on the voter distribution from phase 2, displayed
in Figure 1: if the incumbent is positioned at `It = 5 and the median voter is at location 7, then the informative AG
margin equals −1 if the three voters at location 3 are revealed in period t and the two voters at location 12 were
revealed in period t− 1.
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formation contained in the vote tally is equally useful (in terms of convergence) to candidates in
both treatments.
In columns (III) and (IV), we restrict our focus to the AG treatments, and we evaluate the
effect of the information revealed by advocacy groups. Specification (III) includes the informative
AG margin along with the vote margin. The estimates yield a positive and statistically significant
coefficient for both variables.33 This indicates that candidates use both, the information revealed
by advocacy groups and the information contained in the vote tally. Hence, it appears that the
information from elections and the information transmitted by advocacy groups are complementary
in shaping the challengers’ location choices. Quantitatively, however, the AG margin has twice
the impact of the vote margin. Finally, column (IV) includes the total AG margin. The estimates
show that the additional variable is economically and statistically insignificant and has hardly any
effect on the point estimates for the other coefficients. Since the total AG margin captures the
potential effect of uninformative advocacy groups, we can conclude that challengers ignore these
groups when deciding where to locate. Hence, they do understand that uninformative advocacy
groups convey no new information.
Result 5 In their movement towards the median voter’s location, candidates rely on information
contained in the electoral outcome and the information revealed by the advocacy groups. Candidates
respond to informative advocacy groups but not to uninformative advocacy groups.
This result, combined with the behavior of voters (see Section 4.3) explains the faster conver-
gence to the median voter’s location in the AG treatments. Lastly, the fact that candidates ignore
uninformative advocacy groups confirms that their formation is a waste of resources—at least in
terms of monetary payoffs—which explains why we see a decline in the number of uninformative
groups over phases (see Section 4.3).
4.5 Payoffs
The results discussed above establish that voters do form advocacy groups and that, by doing so,
they speed up convergence to the median voter’s location. We now study to which extent the
payoff gains from quicker convergence offset the costs of forming advocacy groups. A look at the
mean payoff of voters suggests that payoff gains and group-formation costs cancel each other out.
Voters in the NA treatment earn on average 49.32 points per period. In contrast, voters in the
AG12, AG18, and AG24 treatments earn on average 48.78, 49.14, and 48.67 points, respectively.
Compared to NA, payoffs are significantly lower in AG12 and AG24 (p ≤ 0.057 and p ≤ 0.014)
and are not significantly different in AG18 (U = 0.834). Hence, the data reject conjecture 4 (for
AG12 and AG24): the AG treatments fail to yield an overall payoff increase.
Figure 6 provides a more detailed look at the payoffs. For each phase, the figure depicts the
mean payoff gains (losses) due to faster (slower) convergence in each AG treatment compared to
33The standard error of the coefficient for the vote margin increases because of the smaller sample size and the
fairly high correlation between the vote margin and the informative AG margin.
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Figure 6: Mean voter payoff in each AG treatment excluding group formation costs minus the mean
voter payoff in the NA treatment (light blue bars) and (mean cost per voter of forming of advocacy
groups depending on whether the group was informative or uninformative. The area marked by
the dashed line corresponds to the payoff difference caused by the outlier election discussed in
Section 4.2.
the NA treatment—i.e., the mean payoff in an AG treatment excluding group formation costs
minus the mean payoff in the NA treatment. In addition, the figure displays the mean cost of
forming informative as well as uninformative groups, respectively.
Figure 6 clearly indicates that, in phase 1, the AG treatments yield on average lower payoffs
than the NA treatment. Voters in AG treatments do not benefit from faster convergence during
this phase. At the same time, they incur considerable costs from the formation of informative and
uninformative advocacy groups. The payoffs in this phase are therefore significantly lower in each
AG treatment compared to NA (U ≥ 3.364, p ≤ 0.057).
Phase 2 shows a considerable improvement in the relative payoffs in the AG treatments: con-
vergence speeds up and the number of advocacy groups decreases. In all AG treatments, the gains
of faster convergence exceed the costs of forming advocacy groups. In AG18 this results in signif-
icantly higher payoffs compared to NA (U = 2.502, p = 0.057). In AG12 and AG24 the difference
is not statistically significant (U = 1.775, p ≤ 0.100, and U = 0.834, p > 0.100 respectively).
For phase 3, we get once again inconclusive results. Correcting for the outlier election in AG12
(see Section 4.2), we observe that all AG treatments do better than NA in terms of convergence.
However, the payoff advantage from faster convergence is small and thus canceled out by the costs
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of advocacy groups. We do not find a significant difference in payoffs between NA and any of the
AG treatments (U ≤ 0.384).34
Result 6 The opportunity to form advocacy groups does not yield higher monetary payoffs to the
voters: on average, the payoff gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of forming
advocacy groups.
While advocacy groups do not have a positive effect on average payoffs, one might argue that
quicker convergence on one hand and the option of forming a group on the other constitute a
positive welfare effect beyond payoffs. Advocacy groups give voters an additional channel to make
themselves heard and to express their preferences. This case is supported by some of the evidence
from Section 4.3, which points towards expressive motives in the formation of uninformative groups.
If these groups are not the result of mistakes but of preference-revealing acts, then uninformative
groups do contribute to welfare. Hence, accounting for the non-payoff-instrumental welfare effects
that are implicit in groups, the AG treatments could outperform the NA treatment.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the formation of advocacy groups and their role in transmitting information
in a laboratory experiment. Within a spatial electoral competition setting, we find that voters
make frequent use of the costly opportunity to form advocacy groups and reveal information to
candidates. This additional information accelerates convergence to the median voter equilibrium,
especially after major preference shocks where the endogenous creation of advocacy facilitates the
transition to the new equilibrium.
One contribution of our paper is documenting several interesting patterns in the formation
of advocacy groups. First, the more voters share a political preference, the more likely they are
to form an advocacy group. In other words, rather than struggling with an aggravated free-
rider/coordination problem, larger groups of voters are more active in collective action. Second,
voters behave as conditional cooperators: namely, they are more likely to engage in the collective
action of forming an advocacy group if they expect others will do so as well. It is worth noting that
both of these patterns closely resemble evidence from public goods experiments. Third, voters with
preferences that strongly differ from the incumbent’s location are more active in forming advocacy
groups. This observation is consistent with the view that individuals who think that their opinions
are not being represented in the political process are willing to organize in order to express their
voice. Fourth, and consistent with this idea of an expressive motive, we observe the formation of
informative as well as uninformative advocacy groups. Some of the evidence suggests that these
34If we exclude the costs of forming uninformative groups, we find that all AG treatments have significantly higher
payoffs compared to NA in phase 2 (p ≤ 0.014 in all cases). Thus, if voters had restricted themselves to forming
only informative groups, the payoff gains from faster convergence would have exceeded the costs of forming advocacy
groups (assuming that, as suggested by Result 4, convergence is unaffected by lack of uninformative advocacy
groups). In contrast, excluding the costs of uninformative groups in phase 3 is not enough to deliver a payoff gain
in the AG treatments (U ≤ 1.027).
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latter groups, which do not reveal any new information, are at least partly triggered by a motive
of “expressive advocacy”.
All these patterns might be used to guide theories of how voters transmit information to
candidates. Further exploring the robustness of our findings is a promising avenue for further
research. In this respect, we think it is particularly promising to study more the possible expressive
dimension of political collective action. In addition, it would be interesting to investigate the effects
of weakening some of our stronger assumptions. For example, by running an experiment where
voters only know a fraction of the other voters in their location or where forming an advocacy
group reveals only some of the voters with a particular policy preference.
Finally, from the perspective of optimal democratic governance, it is important to stress that the
costs of advocacy had no significant effect on the formation of informative groups but reduced the
frequency at which uninformative groups emerged. Hence, decreasing advocacy costs had neither a
beneficial effect on the intensity of preference revelation nor on the speed of convergence. This last
finding suggests that—in a democratic society with non-inhibitive costs of collective action—the
spread of new communication technologies and the corresponding decline in the costs of organizing
might only increase the frequency of expressive but not necessarily informative advocacy. In less
developed democracies, however, the same technological innovations might allow for an important
step towards more information transmission and better governance. It is up for future research to
confront these implications with field data.
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Appendix A Experimental Procedures and Instructions
The computerized experiment was run at the CREED laboratory of the University of Amsterdam.
In total 336 undergraduate students participated in the experiment. About two fifths of the
subjects were women (38% to be precise). After arrival in the lab’s reception room, each subject
drew a card to be randomly assigned to a seat in the laboratory. Once everyone was seated, the
instructions for the experiment were given out. Subjects first received a set of general instructions
that describe the game. After the general instructions subjects answered a few questions to ensure
their understating of the game. Thereafter, they were told whether they had been assigned to
the role of a voter or a candidate. Voters and candidates then received additional instructions
explaining in greater detail their possible actions and payoffs. After these specific instructions,
subjects answered a final set of control questions before starting to play the game. During the
game in the AG treatments, we provided candidates with a sheet of paper that could be used
to keep track of the number of advocacy groups that were formed in each period. After the 24
periods of the game were over, subjects were paid their earnings in private and were dismissed.
The average session lasted approximately 90 minutes.
The instructions used in the AG12 treatment (authors’ translation from Dutch to English) are
available in the online supplementary materials. The instructions for other treatments (in Dutch)
are very similar and are also available upon request.
Appendix B Illustration of the challenger’s problem
We illustrate the complex tradeoffs for a challenger in an example where the incumbent is posi-
tioned at location 12 and the challenger j lost last period’s election, where she was positioned at
location 11. Assume further that she has not yet tried location 13 and that all voters vote sincerely.
The past election outcome indicates that the voting equilibrium must be at locations [12, 15]. She
therefore considers which of the locations [13, 15] to choose (recall that j cannot pick the incum-
bent’s location 12). Let us denote by p(`t) challenger j’s belief about the chance that location `
is the equilibrium in period t. Moreover, let pi be the fixed payoff from winning one election and
T > 1 denotes her expected number of periods until the next preference-shock occurs (or the num-
ber of remaining periods of the game). Let us first consider the expected, accumulated payoff (i.e.,
we assume risk neutrality and neglect any discounting) from the remaining T periods, E(pi(`t)), if
j chooses `t = 13 in period t. This is given by
E(pi(13)) = p(13)× (pi × T ) + p(14)
(
pi + q(14|13)× 0 + q(15|13)
(
1
2
pi +
1
2
pi(T − 2)
))
+p(15) (pi + q(14|13)× pi(T − 2) + q(15|13)× 0)
= pi
(
p(13)× T + p(14)
(
1 +
q(15|13)
2
(T − 1)
)
+ p(15) (1 + q(14|13)(T − 2))
)
,
for T ≥ 2. The expected payoff consists of the expected earnings if the median were either at
location (i) 13, (ii) 14, or (iii) 15 (the expected payoff from the incumbent being already at the
median voter’s location is p(12) × 0 = 0). In the first case (i), if the median were at location 13,
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she would earn payoff pi for T periods. (ii) If the median were at location 14 (while she picked
13), j would definitively win this period (as the incumbent is located at 12). However, in the
following period she would be fixed at location 13. Her expected payoff would then be given by
q(14|13), her belief (conditional on j positioning at 13) about the other candidate choosing the
winning location 14—which would allow him to win all remaining periods, leaving a payoff of zero
for j—and q(15|13), her belief about the other candidate choosing location 15. For the latter case,
voters would decide between candidates at 13 and 15. With the median voter at 14 and a random
vote split, j would have a fifty percent chance of winning at 13. If j wins, the other candidate
would move to 14 in the subsequent period and would win all remaining elections. In case j loses
in t + 1, she would move to 14 and would win all the remaining (T − 2) periods. Finally, (iii) if
the median were at location 15, j would certainly win this period. If the other candidate would
choose location 14 in period t+ 1, he would win the election. However, in the subsequent period,
candidate j would pick location 15 and would win all remaining (T − 2) elections.
Following the same logic, it is straightforward to derive j’s expected payoffs if she was to choose
location `t = 14 or `t = 15. Comparing the expected payoffs from these different options one notes
that the choice is not only shaped by the challenger’s expectations about the winning location
but also by the beliefs regarding the other candidate’s behavior and the number of remaining
periods. In the AG treatments, the challenger might have more information and, presumably,
more accurate beliefs about the winning location. The formation of advocacy groups could also
affect beliefs about the other candidate’s behavior. Moreover, the challenger’s decision will further
depend on her expectations regarding the level of information obtained from advocacy groups in
future periods.
This last point, i.e. the fact that both candidates will have more information in subsequent
periods, renders the one-step strategy less attractive: if j does not hit the equilibrium in the
present period, she would allow her competitor to base his decision choice in t + 1 on a larger
information set, thus increasing his chances to position at the median. Stated differently, the
myopic best response of making one step (and winning for sure) is less attractive and there are
stronger incentives to immediately jump to the expected median. In turn, we should see larger
jumps in the AG treatments.
Appendix C Additional Figures
Figure C.1 shows the convergence paths of each session, the behavior of both candidates, and the
location of the median voter. The outlier election can be seen at the end of AG12 session 1.
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Figure C.1: Location of candidates 1 and 2 (green and blue lines) as well as the winning location
(black dot) per session and period. The thin red line corresponds to the median voter locations.
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